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country's  national  Expertise  institutions  that  will  place  the  description  of  
the  document  in  the  common  system,  setting  a  term  of  1  month  before  the  
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Abstract. The subject of the paper "Analysis of False Documents Detected at the Border 
Control of European Union Member States and the Prospective Methods for the Detection 
of Counterfeits" is topical, as the verification of the authenticity of travel documents is the 
cornerstone of border controls; also, the interrelations between the techniques of 
producing false documents discovered in the EU Member States and the practical 
application of technologically new methods of document reproduction has not been 
extensively reviewed and evaluated in EU scientific literature and current information 
materials. Identity fraud is expensive: from bank accounts opened with false names to 
money laundering and all kinds of smuggling and terrorism. The endless variety of criminal 
activities gives false documents a high value. In addition, for 3 billion travelers worldwide, 
identity verification needs to be fast, unproblematic and effective. Due to the pressure on 
borders (time constraints and an increasing numbers of travelers) and the increasing 
complexity of modern document security, border control capabilities (officials and/or 
automated systems) are compelled to decide quickly and simply whether documents 
submitted are authentic or false. The operational execution of document verification 
capacity is crucial for the efficiency and security of border checks. The aim of the research 
is to study the quality of false documents discovered at European Union Member States’ 
border inspections and to identify prospective methods of their detection. 
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Every year around 700 million people cross the European Union 
external border. Consequently, one of the main tasks of border checks is to 
detect illegal activities without deterring other travellers. There are no 
permanent border controls between the Schengen countries, so the control 
of external borders is even more important.  
The problem of falsification of travel documents is receiving increasing 
attention in the context of recent terrorist attacks in Europe and current 
migratory flows. Document fraud has become a driver of terrorism and 
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organized crime and is linked to human trafficking and smuggling of 
migrants. In this context, it is essential to strengthen the security of travel 
documents, including the underlying identity management infrastructure 
(Eiropas Komisija, 2016). 
The most important external factors affecting the authentication of 
documents required for border crossing are the production and sale of 
high-quality fake documents under the supervision of organized crime. Use 
of technological production methods identical to producing authentic 
documents, high-quality imitation of security measures of documents, as 
well as the use of stolen and fraudulently obtained blanks of authentic 
documents, high-quality document counterfeits are produced, which 
contributes to the increase of illegal immigration. At the same time, the low 
quality of documents issued for domestic use in many high-risk countries, 
violations of personalization and issuance procedures by the issuing 
authorities, as well as the widespread possibility of obtaining authentic 
identification documents fraudulently have a significant impact on 
verification of a person's identity. 
The verification of a person's identity in the framework of border 
control, immigration control and asylum procedures cases is positively 
impacted by the increasingly used verification of biometric identifiers of 
persons (comparative analysis of facial parameters, fingerprints), as well as 
automated inspection of documents, incl. electronic travel documents, 
visual and electronic components (VRS stratēģija, 2017). 
Hypothesis of the research - the tendencies, volume and quality of 
false documents detected at the state border of the Republic of Latvia are 
interrelated with the indicators of other EU member states in this field, 
which substantiates the need to introduce uniform methods for detecting 
false documents throughout the EU border control area.  
The aim of the paper is to study the peculiarities of false documents 
detected at the border control of the European Union member states, to 
evaluate the technologies and methods used for their falsification and to 
define the perspective methods of detection of false documents. 
In the course of the research the authors have used the following 
research methods: empirical research, qualitative research method 
(document analysis, case analysis), monographic method of research of 
theoretical and empirical sources, research of legislative documents, logical 
analysis method, synthesis method, information statistical analysis method.  
Novelty of the research – the coherence of the methods of production 
of false documents discovered in the EU member states and the practical 
application of technologically new methods in document fraud have not 
been widely discussed and evaluated in the EU scientific literature and 
current informative materials. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
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The growing problem of falsification of travel documents has been 
highlighted in the context of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and 
current migratory flows. Document fraud has become a driver of terrorism 
and organized crime and is linked to human trafficking and smuggling of 
migrants. Combating document fraud is one of the priorities of various 
international, regional and national organizations.  
 
Research results and discussion 
 
The border guard often has very limited time resources to assess the 
authenticity of the document presented. It takes skill and experience to spot 
a false visa stamp or residence permit. It is important to remember that 
false documents are an integral part of various offenses.  
Effective and timely exchange of information between the relevant 
authorities is a precondition for a successful fight against terrorism. The 
work of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) is 
therefore very important for the security of the Member States. A high-
quality and real security union means close cooperation between the 
Member States on security issues, recognizing that the internal security of 
one Member State is the internal security of all Member States and of the 
European Union as a whole (Eiropas Komisija, 2018).  
Effective detection of false documents requires a detailed analysis of 
the falsification methods used, the organization of the activities, the 
methods of using false documents, as well as a high level technical 
equipment, information systems and skilled staff who can draw attention to 
the right aspects based on the risk analysis, and functioning national and 
international cooperation.  The exchange of information on false travel 
documents makes it possible to curb the falsification of documents and is 
therefore an effective contribution to combating crime and smuggling of 
persons across the borders.  
In order to exchange electronically the information on authentic and 
false documents held by the EU Member States and partner countries as 
soon as possible, the False and Authentic Document  Online system 
(hereinafter – FADO) (Ministru Kabineta instrukcija, 2009) was established 
in accordance with the EU Council Joint Action of 3 December 1998 
(98/700 /TI). Such a single and common information system is a very 
useful tool in the fight against falsification of documents, as it facilitates the 
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detection of such documents. The main feature of the FADO system is the 
possibility for the EU Member States to upload online information on 
detected falsified documents or to add alerts on falsified documents. 
Following certain quality management procedures, all information 
contained in the FADO is available to each EU Member State and is 
structured and illustrated. FADO information provides an opportunity to 
qualitatively check the authenticity of a document (based on descriptions of 
specimen documents); to inform all EU Member States in real time about 
current detected falsifications; to analyse trends in the use of false 
documents, methods of falsification and, on the basis of this information, to 
assess the readiness to detect similar fraud. 
EU agencies are closely involved in the fight against document fraud. 
FRONTEX provides the Member States with document expert teams and 
tools for inspections that are carried out when migrants arrive at the 
hotspots, as well as provides training and risk analysis. The work of the 
European Counter-Terrorism Centre at Europol focuses on the link between 
false documents and terrorism, while document security is an important 
issue for Europol's European Migrant Smuggling Centre. In addition to the 
current tools used for border management and the successful exchange of 
information on the use of false documents, there is an Interpol SDLT (Stolen 
and Lost Travel Document) database and an Advance Passenger 
Information (API) system that collects passenger information before flights 
to the EU. These tools are important for both EU citizens and third-country 
nationals.  
One of the means of exchanging information is the activities of liaison 
officers. It aims to strengthen controls at the EU external borders and to 
develop effective management of migration flows in line with Schengen 
requirements. State Border Guard Liaison Officers in Belarus, Georgia and 
Russia have facilitated cross-border co-operation and the expansion of 
professional contacts between law enforcement agencies of the EU Member 
States and third countries, thus reducing illegal cross-border activities and 
combating illegal immigration to the EU Member States.  
In order to provide a broader overview on the situation with false 
documents detected at the external borders of the EU Member States, the 
authors have reviewed data for the period from 2015 to 2018. The analysis 
of false documents within that period shows that the number of the cases of 
use of false documents has been permanently high year after year: the EU 
Member States have reported 8361 person who presented false documents 
when entering the EU/EEA from the third countries in 2015, 6998 persons 
in 2016 , 6670 in 2017, and 6667 persons in 2018. 
At present, the passports most frequently fraudulently used at the EU's 
external borders are authentic Moroccan passports in the hands of Syrian 
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order to obtain blanks of authentic documents.  
 
Table 1. Detection of persons using false documents on entry at 
the external borders by Member State, border type and top ten 




As the Republic of Latvia is one of the EU member states, the authors of 
the paper have also reflected the contribution of the Latvian border guards 
at the external borders of the EU member states in the field of detected false 
documents. With the increasing number of migrants, the number of false 
documents used at the Latvian state border has increased proportionally. 
The "Northern Route" of illegal immigration through the Russian 
Federation to Finland and Norway and its branch through the border of the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia and the border of the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Estonia is still considered a significant 
threat. 
The transit of illegal immigration of certain groups of illegal 
immigrants, such as Vietnamese nationals through the Russian Federation 
to the Republic of Latvia and further to Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Germany is affected by the former economic ties and large diasporas in the 
target countries, as well as strengthening of legislation governing 
immigration in the Russian Federation setting stricter requirements for 
obtaining a residence and work permit. This has forced many long-term 
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economic migrants that has lived in the Russian Federation to seek new 
income opportunities in the EU Member States.  
The predominant false documents at the borders of the Republic of 
Latvia are Italian documents (mostly Schengen visas and ID cards), 
Lithuanian documents (Schengen visas, vehicle documents, driving 
licenses), French documents (Schengen visas, residence permits, ID cards).  
In May 2019 at the conference "Security Identification 2019" in Riga, 
the FRONTEX Agency's Centre of Excellence for Combatting Document 
Fraud (CED) announced the most current trends in the falsification and 
misuse of documents at the borders and within the EU Member States: 
 complexity of document falsification techniques (fully/partially 
falsified documents – mechanically and chemically washed visas, 
overprinting, production of laser engraved documents); 
 new techniques are being developed to misuse biometrics 
(Morphing); 
 increased misuse of authentic documents (identity theft – impostors); 
 fraudulent use of identity documents to obtain authentic travel 
documents (authentic documents are issued by an official authority 
on the basis of a false birth or marriage certificate); 
 very high demand for EU travel documents among falsifiers. (Frontex, 
2018) 
With the increasing level of protection of travel documents and the use 
of the latest automated document verification equipment, illegal 
immigrants choose to travel as impostors and use other persons' identities 
more often than before. The introduction of more sophisticated security 
features, systems for verification of document production methods and 
document checks make it more difficult to falsify identity and travel 
documents. However, in response, falsifiers are increasingly turning from 
traditional forgeries involving physical documents (such as changing the 
validity of a passport or reproducing a completely authentic document) to 
other forms of document fraud, such as the use of authentic documents by 
impostors. Impostor is a person who pretends to be somebody else and 
misuses authentic documents. Among travel documents, the passport is the 
predominant type of document used by impostors. Identification of a 
person by photographs when checking the travel documents of persons 
crossing the state border is an integral part of border control, which is one 
of the most important components of the examination of identity 
documents and aims to prevent a person from entering and leaving the 
country with misused authentic documents. Each time the examiner takes 
the handed over identity document, he must make a quick and reasoned 
decision: whether the document is authentic, whether the photograph 
corresponds to the person presenting the document. The current problem 
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decision: whether the document is authentic, whether the photograph 
corresponds to the person presenting the document. The current problem 
of impostors at the external borders of the EU is evidenced by the statistical 
indicators of FRONTEX: in 2018, 6483 cases of misuse of authentic 
documents by impostors were detected, thus number of the cases had 
increased by 23% in comparison with 2017 (Souchet, 2019). In Latvia, 7 
cases (in 2017 – 8) of misuse of authentic documents by impostors were 
detected in 2018; these were citizens of Nigeria, Russia, Lithuania, 
Tajikistan, and Latvia. 
According to statistics, authentic French (60.4%), British (45.6%), 
Spanish (56.6%), Swedish (76.8%) and Dutch (73.9%) passports are the 
most commonly used.  
New techniques are being developed to misuse biometrics: morphed 
images, misuse of certificates to obtain authentic travel documents based 
on a false civil status document, issuing authentic documents by the official 
authorities. These are the most current trends at the external borders of the 
EU Member States. There is no a 100% detection solution for all types of 
fraudulent documents. For example, morphing attacks in the context of 
border control are a relatively new and undocumented phenomenon. Image 
morphing is a processing technique used to calculate the transformation 
from one image to another, which can be achieved by processing images of 
face, iris, or fingerprints. In an attempt to obtain an authentic travel 
document, illegal applicants submit a morphed image to the issuing 
authority when initiating the registration procedure. This is called 
Morphing Attack Detection. If fraud is successful, several people have the 
opportunity to cross the border, providing wanted criminals with the 
opportunity to use an authentic passport to enter a country with a false 
identity (Hor, 2017). 
Falsification of biometric passports and morphed images is a challenge 
for both research institutions and law enforcement authorities of the 
Schengen member states. The use of biometric technologies, which offer 
new possibilities for border management, will facilitate the crossing of 
borders by bona fide travellers, while making the border more secure. In 
particular, it is acknowledged that the large-scale integration of such 
technologies into the border control infrastructure also poses new 
challenges for the border security: biometric systems can be hacked to 
make it difficult to identify fraudulent travellers during border checks. This 
means that the introduction of new technologies that support biometric 
identification also requires countermeasures that can prevent such attacks 
(i.e., detect and prevent fraudulent use of biometric technologies). One 
option to address this issue may be to suggest that a high-resolution facial 
image be retained in the document chip, which could be used to analyse the 
facial image in case of suspected morphing (Sticere, 2019). This will require 
the use of new standard chips in travel documents. One of the priorities 
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mentioned in the State Border Guard Operational Strategy for 2017–2019 is 
to increase the efficiency of border checks by using modern technical 
solutions for border checks based on the processing of biometric data. 
Analysing the information included in iFADO from the alerts of the EU 
member states on detected false documents, it was found that out of the 
total number of alerts  in 2019 (2450), there were 142 alerts (5.7% of the 
total number) on visa fraud.  Among descriptions of fake visas, a clear 
tendency can be noted – use of authentic visa blanks, where the original 
information is changed in the visa by etching (washing off) it and entering 
other information instead. Compared to the trends of the previous years, 
these forgeries are of very good quality. It is not insignificant that offenders 
use a printer corresponding to the specimen when inserting new data. 
Due to the constantly evolving printing technology and the very high 
resolution of the image produced on it, forged documents are also of high 
quality. This is particularly the case for very high quality images of false 
border stamps, which are made up of fine details and images that make it 
difficult to see the features of how the stamp image is made. To increase the 
effective ability to detect false documents, the glass magnification (10x) that 
is curently used in Line I is insufficient. The authors of the paper consider 
that the minimum requirements for Line I border inspection equipment 
should be changed, setting a mandatory requirement to use magnifiers with 
a magnification of at least 15x. Based on the research of the features of 
document forgery, it can be stated that the use of such more powerful 
technical tools in the initial inspection of border control documents would 
be necessary not only for the State Border Guard officials, but for all border 
guards of the EU Member States. In order to align the recommendations of 
the EU border guidance regulations with current practical trends and to 
strengthen perspective techniques for detecting false documents, it is 
necessary to amend the recommendations of the general requirements of 
the Borders section of the Schengen Catalogue. At the same time, the 
improvement of the above-mentioned technical equipment in the structural 
units of the State Border Guard must be implemented. 
An analysis of false documents detected in the EU Member States, their 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, new features of falsification 
technologies and methodology of false document detection, leads to 
conclusion that in addition to the long-standing traditional falsification 
techniques, innovative falsification techniques have been identified at the 
EU external borders in recent years (re-printing of initial data, use of very 
high quality printing equipment, application of gentle mechanical and 
chemical effects on the document, chip cloning, morphing a person's facial 
image). Researching and comparing the trends and volume of false 
documents in the EU and the Republic of Latvia, the authors have found 
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total number of alerts  in 2019 (2450), there were 142 alerts (5.7% of the 
total number) on visa fraud.  Among descriptions of fake visas, a clear 
tendency can be noted – use of authentic visa blanks, where the original 
information is changed in the visa by etching (washing off) it and entering 
other information instead. Compared to the trends of the previous years, 
these forgeries are of very good quality. It is not insignificant that offenders 
use a printer corresponding to the specimen when inserting new data. 
Due to the constantly evolving printing technology and the very high 
resolution of the image produced on it, forged documents are also of high 
quality. This is particularly the case for very high quality images of false 
border stamps, which are made up of fine details and images that make it 
difficult to see the features of how the stamp image is made. To increase the 
effective ability to detect false documents, the glass magnification (10x) that 
is curently used in Line I is insufficient. The authors of the paper consider 
that the minimum requirements for Line I border inspection equipment 
should be changed, setting a mandatory requirement to use magnifiers with 
a magnification of at least 15x. Based on the research of the features of 
document forgery, it can be stated that the use of such more powerful 
technical tools in the initial inspection of border control documents would 
be necessary not only for the State Border Guard officials, but for all border 
guards of the EU Member States. In order to align the recommendations of 
the EU border guidance regulations with current practical trends and to 
strengthen perspective techniques for detecting false documents, it is 
necessary to amend the recommendations of the general requirements of 
the Borders section of the Schengen Catalogue. At the same time, the 
improvement of the above-mentioned technical equipment in the structural 
units of the State Border Guard must be implemented. 
An analysis of false documents detected in the EU Member States, their 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, new features of falsification 
technologies and methodology of false document detection, leads to 
conclusion that in addition to the long-standing traditional falsification 
techniques, innovative falsification techniques have been identified at the 
EU external borders in recent years (re-printing of initial data, use of very 
high quality printing equipment, application of gentle mechanical and 
chemical effects on the document, chip cloning, morphing a person's facial 
image). Researching and comparing the trends and volume of false 
documents in the EU and the Republic of Latvia, the authors have found 
how the trends, volume and quality of false documents at the border of the 
Republic of Latvia are related to other EU Member States in this area, which 
justifies the need to introduce a uniform perspective tools for fraud 
detection throughout the EU border control area.  
The most important precondition for successful detection of false 
documents is technical equipment and information systems. In order to 
detect the features of technologically high-quality forged documents in the 
Line I border control, technical equipment with higher technical 
parameters is required (image magnification level, application of additional 
lighting, and automated document authentication check). Qualitative 
verification of electronic documents requires mandatory verification of all 
electronic security mechanisms of the document (BAC, PACE, AA, PA, EAC). 
Successful detection of impostors and morphed facial images of a person 
requires a comparison of the person's biometric data with the fingerprint 
embedded in the chip. 
 
Conclusions and suggestions 
 
The authors conclude: 
After a comprehensive analysis of the false documents detected in the 
EU Member States, their quantitative and qualitative indicators, new 
features of falsification technologies and the methodology of detection of 
falsification, the authors have come to the following conclusions: 
1. The tendencies, volume and quality of false documents detected at the 
state border of the Republic of Latvia are interrelated with the 
indicators of other EU Member States in this field, which substantiates 
the need to introduce uniform prospective methods of detecting false 
documents throughout the EU border control area. 
2. Alongside long-standing traditional document falsification techniques, 
innovative forms of document falsification have been identified at the 
EU external borders in recent years (reprinting of original data, using 
very high quality office equipment for printing, applying gentle 
mechanical and chemical effects on document, chip cloning, facial 
image morphing).  
3. Among traveling documents, the passports are predominant type of 
documents used by impostors. At the moment, the passports 
predominantly misused at the EU external borders are authentic 
Moroccan passports in the hands of Syrian citizens, as well as Swedish, 
French, British, and Spanish passports. More than 80% of misused 
documents are issued in the EU Member States. Offenders are more 
likely to try to obtain authentic documents using corruption in the 
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administrative authorities to obtain blanks of authentic documents 
than to rely on costly counterfeits. 
4. Electronic authentication of travel documents of third-country 
nationals is an essential component of the future entry/exit system; it 
contributes to security by helping to detect and prevent identity theft 
and misuse of travel documents. In addition, this system will prevent 
identity fraud by managing the biometric identity of third-country 
nationals.  
5. In order to detect the features of technologically reproduced false 
documents at the Line I of border inspection, technical equipment with 
higher technical parameters (image magnification level, application of 
additional lighting, and automated document authentication) is 
required.  
6. Qualitative verification of authenticity of electronic documents 
requires mandatory verification of all electronic security mechanisms 
of the document (BAC, PACE, AA, PA, EAC). 
7. Successful detection of impostors and morphed facial images of a 
person requires a comparison of the person's biometric data with the 
fingerprint embedded in the chip.  
In order to improve the methods for detecting document fraud used by 
the border guard services of the EU Member States in accordance with the 
findings of the study, the authors propose to establish a working group of 
the European Commission, which will be able to initiate and make the 
following amendments to the Schengen catalogue: 
1. Initiate an amendment to Chapter 2, Paragraph 3, Point 44 of the 
Schengen Catalogue, including the following additional requirements 
for the technical equipment of  Line I border checks: 
- document inspection equipment with infrared lighting; 
- magnifier with at least 15x magnification; 
- document reader with electronic document security mechanism (BAC, 
PACE, EAC, AA, PA) verification capabilities. 
2. Initiate an amendment to Chapter 2,  Paragraph 3, Point 46 of the 
Schengen Catalogue, including additional requirements for the 
following technical equipment of the Line II border checks: 
- a stereomicroscope with a magnification of at least 60x; 
- document reader with electronic document security mechanism (BAC, 
PACE, EAC, AA, PA) verification capabilities. 
3. The State Border Guard shall ensure the following improvements to 
the document examination system: 
- to update the technical equipment of document inspection at all border 
crossing points, providing border inspection Line I with magnifying 
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than to rely on costly counterfeits. 
4. Electronic authentication of travel documents of third-country 
nationals is an essential component of the future entry/exit system; it 
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and misuse of travel documents. In addition, this system will prevent 
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5. In order to detect the features of technologically reproduced false 
documents at the Line I of border inspection, technical equipment with 
higher technical parameters (image magnification level, application of 
additional lighting, and automated document authentication) is 
required.  
6. Qualitative verification of authenticity of electronic documents 
requires mandatory verification of all electronic security mechanisms 
of the document (BAC, PACE, AA, PA, EAC). 
7. Successful detection of impostors and morphed facial images of a 
person requires a comparison of the person's biometric data with the 
fingerprint embedded in the chip.  
In order to improve the methods for detecting document fraud used by 
the border guard services of the EU Member States in accordance with the 
findings of the study, the authors propose to establish a working group of 
the European Commission, which will be able to initiate and make the 
following amendments to the Schengen catalogue: 
1. Initiate an amendment to Chapter 2, Paragraph 3, Point 44 of the 
Schengen Catalogue, including the following additional requirements 
for the technical equipment of  Line I border checks: 
- document inspection equipment with infrared lighting; 
- magnifier with at least 15x magnification; 
- document reader with electronic document security mechanism (BAC, 
PACE, EAC, AA, PA) verification capabilities. 
2. Initiate an amendment to Chapter 2,  Paragraph 3, Point 46 of the 
Schengen Catalogue, including additional requirements for the 
following technical equipment of the Line II border checks: 
- a stereomicroscope with a magnification of at least 60x; 
- document reader with electronic document security mechanism (BAC, 
PACE, EAC, AA, PA) verification capabilities. 
3. The State Border Guard shall ensure the following improvements to 
the document examination system: 
- to update the technical equipment of document inspection at all border 
crossing points, providing border inspection Line I with magnifying 
glasses with a magnification of at least 15x  and border inspection Line 
II with microscopes with a magnification of at least 60x; 
- to introduce the most up-to-date and secure chip access mechanism in 
the process of reading electronic documents at border checks – 
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE); 
- to ensure the interoperability of REIS with the repository of document 
authentication certificates, and in the process of document 
authentication mandatory to perform passive authentication (PA) 
verification of the electronic document chip; 
- for successful and reliable person's identification,  to organize the 
interoperability of REIS with the document certificate repository and 
to ensure the introduction of the extended data access mechanism 
(EAC), which will allow comparing the fingerprints on the chip with 
the fingerprints of the document holder. 
 
References 
1. Eiropas Komisijas paziņojums Eiropas parlamentam un padomei (2016). Rīcības 
plāns stingrākai Eiropas darbībai pret ceļošanas dokumentu viltošanu. Publications 
Office of the EU. Retrieved October 5, 2020, from 
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2016:0790:FIN:LV:P
DF  
2. Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regula par Eiropas Robežu un krasta apsardzi un 
ar ko atceļ Padomes Vienoto rīcību Nr. 98/700/JHA, Eiropas Parlamenta un 
Padomes Regulu (ES) Nr. 1052/2013 un Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulu 
(ES) 2016/1624 (2018). Eiropas Komisijas ieguldījums vadītāju sanāksmē Zalcburgā, 
2018.gada 19.–20.septembrī. Retrieved October 5, 2020, from 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/LV/COM-2018-631-F1-
LV-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
3. Hor, T. (2017) Developing harmonized automated border control (ABC) training 
capabilities. ICAO TRIP Magazine, 2 (12). Retrieved October 5, 2020,  from 
 https://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2017/TRIP_Vol12_No2.pdf 
4. Ministru kabineta instrukcija Nr.12 (2009). Viltoto un autentisko dokumentu (False 
and Authentic Documents) informācijas sistēmas veidošanas, aktualizēšanas un 
izmantošanas kārtība. Latvijas Republikas tiesību akti. Retrieved October 5, 2020, 
from https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=195371. 
5. Risk Analysis for 2019 (2019). Warsaw: Frontex. Retrieved October 5, 2020, from 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk_A
nalysis_for_2019.pdf 
6. SOUCHET, J. (2019). New Trends about Document Fraud at European level. 
Proceedings of ICBWG Seminar and Meeting Windhoek. FRONTEX Centre of 
Excellence for Combating Document Fraud. Short URL: https://rb.gy/dfogoo 
7. STICERE, I. (2019). Par dalību FRONTEX aģentūras organizētajā starptautiskajā 
konferencē par robežu biometriju: morfēšana un tā uzbrukumu noteikšanas 
metodes. Latvijas Republikas valsts robežsardzes dienesta ziņojums. Polijā, Varšavā. 
8. Valsts robežsardzes darbības stratēģija. 2017. – 2019.gadam (2017). Retrieved 
October 5, 2020, from https://www.rs.gov.lv/faili/doc2013/vrs_strategija_2017.-
2019.g..pdf 
  
f s  
. i   i ij   i j   i   l t     i  ( ).  īcī as  
l   ti i  i   ī i  t  ļ   t   ilt .  blications  
ffi   f    .  i     ,  ,  fr   
: l . . ri r x riSer .do?uri=CO :2016:0790:FIN:LV:PD 
F   
. ir   arla enta  un  Padomes  Regula  par  Eiropas  Robežu  n  krasta  apsardzi  un  ar  
ko  atceļ  Padomes  Vi noto  rīcību  Nr.  98/700/JHA,  Eiropas  Pa lament   un  Padomes  
Regulu  (ES)  Nr.  1052/20 3  un  Eiropas  Parl menta  un  P domes  Regulu  (ES)  
2016/1624  ( 018).  Eiropas  Komisijas  ieguldījums  vadītāju  sanāksmē  Zalcb rgā,  
.   . .se te rī .  etrie e   ct er  ,  ,  fro   
tt s: c. r . tr s r c reg c/rep/1/2018/LV/COM-2018-631-F1-LV- 
MAIN-PART-1.PDF  
3. or,  T.  (2017)  eveloping  har onized  auto ated  border  control  ( C)  training  
ca a ilities.  IC   I   agazine,    ( ).  etrieved  October  5,  2020,   from  
  tt s:// .ica .i t/ blications/journalsreports/2017/TRIP_Vol12_No2.pdf  
. i istr   i t   i str cij   r.   ( ).  ilt t     t tis o  entu  (False  
  t ti   t )  i f r ij   i t   i š ,  t li šanas  un  
iz antošanas  kārtība.  Latvijas  Republikas  tiesību  akti.  etrieved  ctober  5,  2020,  
fro   https://liku i.lv/doc.php?id=195371 .  
. isk  alysis  for    ( ).  arsa :  Fro tex.  etrieve   cto er  ,  ,  fro   
tt s://fr tex.e r a.e /assets/ lications/ isk_ nalysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk_A 
nalysis_for_2019.pdf  
6. S C ET,  J.  (2019).  e   Trends  about  ocu ent  Fraud  at  European  level.  
Proceedings  of  ICB G  Se inar  and  eeting  indhoek .  F TEX  Centre  of  
xcellence  for  o bating  ocu ent  Fraud.  Short  L:  https://rb.gy/dfogoo  
7. STICERE,  I.  (2019).  Par  dalību  FRONTEX  aģentūras  organizētajā  starptautiskajā  
konferencē  par  robežu  bio etriju:  orfēšana  un  tā  uzbruku u  noteikšanas  
etodes.  Latvijas  Republikas  valsts  robežsardzes  dienesta  ziņojums.  Polijā,  Varšavā.  
8. Valsts  robežsardzes  darbības  stratēģija.  2017.  –  2019.gada   (2017).  etrieved  
October  5,  2020,  from 
https://www.rs.gov.lv/faili/doc2013/vrs_strategija_2017.-2019.g..pdf  
